Abstract: This article examines conceptual frameworks for explaining relations between creativity and the hippocampal region (HR) and reports two new experimental studies. In both studies, seventeen people participated in extensive face-to-face interviews: sixteen normal individuals and H.M., an amnesic with cerebellar and HR damage but virtually no neocortical damage. The results indicated that HR damage impairs aspects of everyday language comprehension and production that require creativity-defined as the ability to form new internal representations that satisfy relevant constraints for being useful or valuable in the real world. Study 1 demonstrated deficits in H.M.'s comprehension of creative but not routine aspects of the interviews-extending to the real world twelve prior demonstrations that H.M. understands routine but not novel aspects of experimentally constructed sentences, deficits that reflected his HR damage, but not his cerebellar damage, his explicit or declarative memory problems, inability to comprehend or recall the instructions, forgetting, poor visual acuity, motoric slowing, time pressure, deficits in visual scanning or attentional allocation, lack of motivation, and excessive memory load in the tasks. Study 2 demonstrated similar deficits in H.M.'s ability to produce creative but not routine aspects of conversational discourse, extending findings in five prior sentence production experiments to real-world creativity. Both types of deficits impaired communication in the interviews, results that support some theories of creativity and the HR but not others.
Introduction
The importance of the hippocampal brain region (HR) for learning and memory has been well established, e.g., [1] . But does the HR also play a role in creativity? The present article addresses this deceptively straight-forward question in a readily understood conversational style that illustrates our content focus: face-to-face discourse. However, understanding the relevance of this focus to creativity and the brain is not straight-forward. It requires a close look at the ongoing debates surrounding the definition of creativity.
The call for a broader definition of creativity
The current literature contains many (implicit or explicit) definitions of creativity. Some are clearly over-inclusive. One is the definition Flexible behavior is per se creative, e.g., [2] , which encompasses actions that are routine, habitual and unoriginal, e.g., applying context-appropriate past tense rules acquired as a child [3] . Atypical behaviors are creative, e.g., [2] is another over-inclusive definition-which embraces activities that are counterproductive to society and the individual, e.g., routinely driving one's car at twice the speed limit. Other definitions are under-inclusive, e.g., the idea that Concepts are only creative if nobody has ever formulated them before (see the discussion of Big C creativity in [4] ). This novel-in-the-world criterion calls for historical analyses of creative ideas that are notoriously controversial (Did Leibnitz and Newton simultaneously and independently invent calculus, or not?), unstable over time (see [5] ) and irrelevant from a psychological perspective.
However, one definition enjoys almost universal acceptance: Creativity involves the formation of ideas, concepts or images that are new (for the producer at that particular time) and satisfy relevant constraints for being useful or valuable to the producer and perhaps also to some larger social group; e.g., [6] - [14] . By way of illustrating this the new-and-useful definition of creativity, Shakespeare was being creative when he had Romeo utter "Juliet is the sun" because this proposition was new to him (before writing Romeo and Juliet, Shakespeare had never previously generated or encountered Juliet Capulet described that way), and valuable (it relayed important information in a succinct and memorable manner, allowing Shakespeare's audiences to quickly grasp that Juliet was warm, life-giving, and the center of Romeo's universe-like the sun).
In its favor, the new-and-useful definition encompasses everyday activities such as the creative use of language, a process not confined to geniuses such as Shakespeare. However, the emphasis on products and the producer in the new-and-useful definition seems to exclude the clearly creative processes involved in constructing personal knowledge and understanding [15] - [17] , and the present authors join the many recent calls for broadening and refining the creativity concept [9] , [15] , [18] .
In particular, we believe that detailed understanding of creative processes in the brain requires the concept internal representation. Internal representations are instantiations of ideas, concepts or images that the brain stores for some period of time, however brief or long. The instantiations can be simple, e.g., [19] , or complex, e.g., [20] , but the brain must form them via some biophysical or biochemical means, in however sparse or extensive a population of neurons.
Brain research aside, however, any generally applicable definition of creative processes requires the concept of internal representation. The reason is that images, concepts or ideas formed without an internal representation would not qualify as creative for most creativity researchers. By way of counterfactual illustration, imagine that Shakespeare had used a random process to select words from a dictionary in the ordered categories [ , and thereby generated the sentence "Juliet is the sun" ___ along with many other novel outputs such as "Shirley is the physics." Most experts would call this random, non-representational process non-creative, even if one of its products, namely Juliet is the sun, became useful in the real world.
Besides being necessary in definitions of creativity, the concept of internal representation also speaks to the domain-general versus domain-specific nature of creativity [21] , provides a conceptual scaffolding for investigating relations between learning and creative expressions at any age [18] , [22] - [23] , and integrates under one umbrella concepts such as proactive versus reactive creativity [24] , eminent versus everyday creativity [4] , and the "mini c" creativity involved in developing personal understanding [15] - [17] -which all presuppose the ability to form new internal representations. Also to its credit, the concept of internal representation suggests new directions for future research on creativity and related processes such as planning and imagining (see the General Discussion).
The present creativity research
For all of these reasons, the present article defined creativity as the process of forming internal representations that are new and useful in the real world. Does this definition encompass comprehension? To address this question, let's consider the internal representation that audiences formed when they comprehended Juliet is the sun, and to facilitate exposition, let's indicate the information in this and other internal representations via enclosed braces. So Shakespeare's audiences formed this internal representation: {Romeo thinks Juliet is warm, life-giving, and the center of his universe}-which, being useful in understanding Shakespeare's play, counts as creative under our definition for listeners or readers who had never previously encoded the internal representation {someone is the sun}. And generalizing from this example to all internal representations of new and useful information, our definition of creativity indeed encompasses comprehension.
But wait, wrote a colleague, isn't your creative comprehension concept too general? Doesn't it encompass all grammatically possible interpretations of novel sentences? No. For example, here are three novel and grammatical, but non-creative ways to comprehend Shakespeare's "Juliet is the sun":
{Juliet is the sun's proper name}; {Juliet is millions of miles from earth}; and {Shakespeare's sentence is an oxymoron because Juliet is a human being and the sun is an astronomical body}. By failing to satisfy contextual constraints that could render them useful in the real world, including the constraint that Shakespeare wrote Juliet is the sun, these internal interpretations lack a sine qua non aspect of creativity.
Comprehending everyday discourse is similar: Some conversations engage creative comprehension processes under our definition, while others don't. For example, consider this face-to-face conversation. "Good morning." Response: "Good morning;" "How are you?" Response: "Fine." Here comprehension is routine or non-creative by definition because only familiar, preformed internal representations are involved. However, Conversational Excerpt 1 (from [25] ), illustrates creative comprehension as defined here. The excerpt begins with Jean Chrétien's response to a reporter's request that the Canadian Prime Minister investigate, and perhaps do something about, the 1997 increase in drugs crossing from Canada into the U.S. Never having previously encoded Chrétien's "It's more trade," Clinton clearly formed two novel internal representations when he responded "More drugs, she said:" {because of increased trade, more drugs now cross from Canada into the U.S.}; and {because a Canadian prime minister supporting increased drug traffic into the U.S. is unthinkable, Chrétien may have misheard the question}.
Conversational Excerpt
After Chrétien confirmed that he did indeed mishear, Clinton then expressed a third internal representation that was both novel and useful: {Without this clarification, Chrétien would have to repair the political fallout from his statement and postpone his plan to call an immediate Canadian election}. What made this internal representation useful and therefore creative under our definition?
The laughter it triggered was diplomatically and politically helpful, and Canadians soon re-elected Chrétien without political fallout.
With a definition and clear examples of creative comprehension and production in hand, the present research examined whether HR damage impairs creative aspects of comprehension (Study 1) and production (Study 2) during face-to-face interviews resembling Excerpt 1. The participants were sixteen normal individuals and Henry M.-an amnesic with HR damage.
Study 1: The Creative Comprehension of Discourse
We had good reasons for suspecting that Henry would experience comprehension deficits relative to the normal controls in Study 1: Eight experimental studies conducted between 1974 and 2007 reported major deficits in Henry's ability to comprehend novel but not routine or familiar aspects of isolated sentences. Appendix A summarizes these studies and what makes them important:
All of the participants responded to the same experimentally controlled stimuli, and the memorynormal controls were matched with Henry on relevant dimensions such as age, education, verbal and performance IQ, native language, background, skills, and extraneous (e.g., cerebellar) brain damage.
However, experimental control comes at a cost: By manipulating one or two factors and holding many others constant, experiments are inherently unlike the real world, where a universe of factors is free to vary, e.g., [26] . Laboratory behaviors therefore lack a sine qua non aspect of creativity- analyses questions reflecting inability to hear a word or phrase, e.g., "Did you say gentleman?"
Interviews
The interviews occurred on a single day for the normal speakers but spanned several days for Henry, whose transcript was 182 pages long. To control for transcript length, we calculated the probability of content versus comprehension questions per word that a guest uttered-effectively equating extensiveness of the interviews and interviewee responses in our analyses.
Results

Preliminary analyses
We first computed how many words the guests produced and how many questions they asked (excluding mishearing questions Table 2 ).
Controlling for interview length, the mean proportion of content questions to total words uttered was 0.00037 for H.M. versus a mean of 0.00393 for the controls (SD = 0.00367), a less than 1 SD difference that indicates normal use of content questions. However, the mean proportion of comprehension questions to total words uttered was greater for H.M. (0.00113) than the controls (0.00007, SD = 0.00017), a reliable 6.24 SD difference indicating a comprehension deficit relative to the normal speakers. whereas for every difficult question that normal guests received, their interviewers posed a mean of 1.5 easy questions (SD = 0.74). Henry therefore received a higher ratio of easy (fact) to difficult (opinion) questions (35) than the mean for normal interviewees (1.5 with SD = 0.74), a reliable 45 SD difference. Given this help, it seems reasonable to assume that Henry's comprehension deficits would have been much greater if he and the control interviewees had received equally difficult questions.
Discussion
As expected, Henry asked more comprehension questions in face-to-face interviews than did normal interviewees (with controls for interview and response length). However, Henry was not simply more curious than the normal guests because he asked no more content questions than the normal guests. likewise can't be considered creative unless research with these experimental tasks proceeds to the next step: demonstrations of usefulness in the real world.
Decision biases and the HR
Internal representations and the present results also suggest a critical role for the HR in decision strategies such as the availability bias. Kahneman [48] attributes such biases to the substitution of "fast" (heuristic) processes for the "slow" (evaluative) processes that are often essential when making optimal judgements under uncertainty. In our framework, Kahneman's slow evaluative processes reflect HR involvement, although we prefer the descriptor slow creative processes to highlight the new and useful nature of the internal representations that the HR typically forms. 
Study 2: The Creative Production of Discourse
Hypotheses in Study 2
Based on these prior results, we expected sentence planning deficits in Henry's responses to interview questions in Study 2. As specific operational hypotheses, we predicted relatively more ungrammatical sentences and immediate filler word repetitions for Henry than normal interviewees. Study 2 also determined whether ungrammatical responses facilitated or disrupted ongoing communication in Henry's interviews. This was the logic. Ungrammatical sentences such as "I want some her" are clearly novel but inappropriate when experimenters ask for grammatical responses. 
Method
Participants and transcripts
Participants and transcripts were identical to Study 1.
Procedures
We computed two measures of sentence planning difficulty: the relative frequency of ungrammatical sentences and immediately repeated filler words, i.e., "um….um"s and "uh…. uh's.
Also analyzed was a measure of conversational disruption: the relative frequency of off-topic and circular spirals. Responses to yes-no questions were excluded from analysis.
Results
Sentence planning measures
Consistent with prior experimental observations, Henry's ungrammatical responses usually involved omission of grammatically necessary words, as in this typical example: "He knocked down……of course" instead of "He was knocked down……" or "He got knocked down……."
Henry produced 167 grammatically incorrect and 353 grammatically correct responses, for an ungrammatical-to-grammatical ratio of 0.47 versus a mean ratio of 0.12 (SD = 0.14) for the normal interviewees-a 2.6 SDs difference indicating reliably more ungrammatical responses for Henry than the normal interviewees.
Typical examples of immediately repeated filler words (double "um's" and "uh's) were: "I think of her.. uh.. uh.. peace.. er.. talking……;" and "but.. uh…uh.. well it was more of a fighter-squadron for the Eagle Squadron." Henry produced 0.00077 immediately repeated filler words per spoken word versus a mean of 0.000016 for the normal interviewees (SD = 0.000063), a reliable 11.94 SD difference.
Conversational spirals
Collapsed across circular and off-topic spirals, 49 conversational spirals followed calls for clarification in Henry's transcript, yielding a relative frequency of 0.0016 spirals per word for Henry versus a mean of 0.00026 (SD = 0.00047) for the normal interviewees , a reliable 2.85 SD difference.
Discussion
As predicted, Henry produced relatively more ungrammatical sentences and immediate repetitions of filler words than the normal interviewees in Study 2 (with interviewee responses and interview length controlled). These findings comport with Henry's reliable sentence planning deficits in earlier experiments, including the selective nature of his production deficits: Henry had difficulty integrating familiar word meanings into novel sentence plans, but no difficulty retrieving familiar isolated words (e.g., on the Boston Naming Test; [51]). The same selectivity was observed in Study 2. Henry had difficulty producing novel aspects of conversational speech, e.g., responding to the question "In what ways was the pastor a "seditionist?" in Excerpt 2, but easily produced routine clichés such as, "It is and it isn't" and "you could say" (see Excerpt 3). In short, present results strengthen the theoretical distinction between routine processes versus creative processes. Producing clichés involves routine retrieval of familiar phrases, whereas producing the novel phrases and propositions that one wishes to communicate requires HR engagement to form new and useful cortical representations. But wait, wrote a colleague: To me, a Rorschach-like tangram that reminds me of a Viking ship seems "quite similar to the creative process involved in producing Juliet is the sun." It is not. Second, the distinction between novel versus familiar internal representations is age-and person-specific, as well as task-and word-specific. For example, internal representations of the meaning, pronunciation, and spelling of familiar low frequency words may be functional at age 20, but dysfunctional at age 65: Aging, non-recent use, and infrequent use over the lifetime can destroy internal representations formed as a child, so that on subsequent encounters with a once familiar word, new internal representations of its phonological, orthographic, and semantic properties must be formed, a relearning process that is easy for normal older adults but not for same age amnesics [1] ,
[35].
General discussion
Two fundamentally different theoretical frameworks have guided recent research on relations between the HR and creativity in language use: the Duff-Brown-Schmidt and binding theory frameworks. Without naming them, we earlier discussed the differing definitions of creativity adopted in these frameworks. Here we directly compare the theoretical frameworks themselves.
3.4.2.1.
The Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework
Under the Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework [2] , [68] , the hippocampus has two critical functions related to language use: to bind and store declarative (fact and event) memories involving "arbitrary relations across modalities and domains." So HR damage causes amnesia by preventing storage and retrieval of fact and event memories. How does this impair language use? Because the hippocampus deploys declarative memories to the cortex when needed for on-line linguistic processing, as when event memories call for definite articles to mark tangram labels as previously mentioned.
However, hippocampal facilitation of language processing is limited in the Duff-BrownSchmidt framework. First, language processing also engages non-hippocampal (i.e., non-declarative) memory systems, e.g., the procedural or habit memory system thought to underpin syntactic priming and the learning of statistical regularities in grammars-phenomena that remain "intact in patients with hippocampal amnesia" [68] . Second, hippocampal facilitation is time-limited: After weeks, years or decades, declarative (e.g., semantic) memories for supporting lexical access deploy or migrate permanently from the HR to the neocortex, where they slowly consolidate, independent of the hippocampus [68] . The Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework does not specify how memories travel such great distances, but given that synaptic biochemistry is the generally accepted brain basis for memory, this hypothetical migration process seems unlikely. After all, synapses and synaptic boutons are neuron-specific, and don't travel far from home.
Also problematic for the Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework are Henry's deficits in reading novel sentences and describing novel scenes. Because these tasks engage neither fact nor event memories, these results suggest direct involvement of the HR in language processing per se. Equally problematic is the extensive literature indicating that the HR responds directly to novel but not familiar stimuli (see [69] - [76] . For example, Duncan et al. showed in [69] that fMRI responses in human hippocampus following a probe stimulus co-varied with participants' expectations, as if the HR continuously computes the overlap between expected and novel events, and the ERP-lesion study in [76] extended this novelty-HR link to amnesics. Why the HR responds to novelty is not obvious in the Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework where the hippocampus serves to temporarily store declarative memories that "come to the aid of" cortical processes when needed.
3.4.2.2.
The binding theory framework
The binding theory framework guided the present research on the HR and linguistic creativity. Here conceptual memories reside in the synapses between cortical units and the HR isn't a bank for storing memories, either episodic, semantic, linguistic or procedural. Rather, the HR contains thousands of combinatorial activating mechanisms (known as binding nodes) that "convince" cortical units to represent novel conjunctions of already formed units in specific conceptual categories. For example, one binding node can "commit" or compel a fresh (uncommitted) cortical unit to represent noun phrases that combine the conceptual categories adjective and noun, as when someone creates de novo the noun phrase Alaskan lobsters. Another binding node can commit or "convince" an uncommitted cortical unit to represent verb phrases that combine the categories verb, prepositional phrase and adverbial noun phrase, as when someone creates de novo the verb phrase ate Alaskan lobsters at Scalia's last night.
Analogous but separate binding nodes in the HR create novel declarative memories in the cortex. This brings us to a general question relevant to all forms of creativity: How do binding nodes conjoin two or more preformed conceptual units to form a new or never previously formed unit in the cortex? Although beyond the scope of the present discussion, interested readers can find detailed answers to this theoretical question in [30] and [77] - [78] .
What else distinguishes the two frameworks? Unlike the passive HR-independent consolidation process assumed in Duff-Brown-Schmidt, the HR plays an active role in memory consolidation in binding theory-and this explains why HR amnesics forget at a faster-than-normal rate "recent" memories formed in the years immediately before their brain damage (Ribot's law). The reason is that normal individuals but not amnesics actively re-learn forgotten information that has been rarely used over the lifetime: HR damage prevents the renovation of recently formed (and therefore rarely used) internal representations eroded by disuse and aging, e.g., [1] .
Also unlike the Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework, binding theory readily explains why the HR responds to novelty, but doesn't retrieve already formed memories [32] . Under binding theory, activating mechanisms in the frontal lobe known as sequence nodes retrieve familiar information without HR involvement (for details on how retrieval occurs, see [20] and [78] ). So why does fMRI activity sometimes accompany memory retrieval, e.g., [79] ? After retrieving information X, people typically form new internal representations resembling {I retrieved information X in context Y}.
But wait, wrote a colleague: "Structural priming" remains intact despite HR damage, e.g., [80] .
Doesn't this show that amnesics can form new internal representations? It does not. Structural
priming involves re-activation of the set of sequence nodes representing, say, a passive sentence structure, a process that does not differ in principle from lexical priming (see [20] pp. 39-61). As in
[33], repetition priming occurs with preformed internal representations, but not with new ones (as with novel words and syntactic structures in a foreign language).
Again unlike the Duff-Brown-Schmidt framework, binding theory does not restrict the HR to linking "unrelated" concepts "in rich, multi-modal contexts … across modalities and domains." This is important because forming arbitrary relations, as in memorizing a sequence of unrelated nouns, is rare in real life. The HR usually conjoins related concepts in non-arbitrary ways-as the regularities in Henry's speech and reading errors illustrate. For example, consider again Henry's uncorrected misreading of The boys who were fed hot dogs got stomach aches: "The boys were fed hot dogs got stomach aches." Here Henry omitted the subordinate conjunction who because, under binding theory, HR engagement is necessary to form an internal representation of the novel but logical (non-arbitrary) relation between main and subordinate clauses, here, The boys got stomach aches, and who were fed hot dogs, respectively, e.g., [61] - [62] .
And forming non-arbitrary internal representations is the essence of real world creativity. For example, Shakespeare's Juliet is the sun is useful (and, when newly minted, creative) because it satisfies a range of non-arbitrary constraints involving, e.g., its semantic context in Romeo and Juliet, the shared knowledge of English theater-goers at the time, and the rules of English syntax.
Personal problem solving likewise requires non-arbitrary creativity. Choosing an appropriate and surprising birthday present for your mother-in-law must satisfy many non-arbitrary constraints in order to win her over. And the same applies to artistic creativity. To develop his new and extremely influential (valuable and useful) "cubist" depictions of the world, Picasso had to satisfy many nonarbitrary constraints that art historians are still studying-just as linguists are still studying the plethora of non-arbitrary constraints that govern the creation and acceptance of newly coined words and grammatical sentences in English.
Directions for Future Research
Findings with Henry discussed here suggest new directions for future research on insight problem solving and the brain. For example, the "Aha" reactions of normal participants but not Henry in [81] (see Appendix A) suggest a simple paradigm for investigating whether brain mechanisms underlying the "Aha" experience reflect insight into how to solve a problem, or just emotional responses to having discovered a successful solution (see [82] ). No previous research on insight has focused on the HR in addressing this issue (see [82] for a review), but MacKay's observations suggest that a sudden increase in HR activity will precede normal "Aha" reactions and the "yes" responses that signal discovery of the second interpretation of ambiguous sentences.
However, neither "Aha" reactions nor increased HR activity should precede solutions to routine, familiar or previously solved problems, as when normal participants "discover" the second meaning of a familiar ambiguous word or phrase presented in isolation (see Appendix A).
The present concept of internal representation also suggests new directions for research on relations between the brain and creative versus routine planning, imagining, problem solving and punning. Just as H.M. can use preformed internal representations to comprehend familiar puns as isolated words (see Appendix A; also [31]), amnesics should be able to use internal representations formed before the onset of amnesia to generate familiar puns, to plan routine acts (e.g., getting ready for bed), to imagine routine situations (e.g., sitting in an automobile), and to solve familiar problems (e.g., circumnavigating obstacles on the sidewalk).
Other research directions concern the links established with Henry between the HR and error detection, error correction, the abnormally rapid degradation of well-established memories with aging, the perception of unfamiliar but not familiar aspects of visual scenes, and the comprehension and production of novel but not routine aspects of experimentally constructed sentences and real world conversations (see [1] , [31]-[32], [61] , [83] ; also Appendix A and B and Studies 1-2).
Verifying these links with fresh amnesics and carefully matched controls is an important follow-up step. Tests of the hypothesis that creative processes for comprehending and producing novel phrases are inherently slower than routine processes for retrieving phrases with preformed internal representations represent another research direction. Nonetheless, the need for further research must not mask the significance of Henry's profound deficits in creative comprehension and production. As Ramachandran [84] , p. xi notes, "most of the syndromes in neurology that have withstood the test of time … were initially discovered by a careful study of single cases." 
Comprehending ambiguous sentences
In my 1966 comprehension study in [81] , Henry and control participants (Harvard undergraduates) saw 32 ambiguous sentences one at a time on cards. This is an example: I just don't feel like pleasing salesmen, which can mean either, "I don't want to please salesmen" or "I don't want agreeable salesmen around." The task was to find both meanings for each sentence as quickly possible, say "yes" as soon as they found the second meaning, and briefly describe both meanings. Other differences in results for Henry and the Harvard participants in [81] were more qualitative. The undergraduates often caught their breath and uttered an audible "Aha" or "ah" before responding "yes" to indicate discovery of the second meaning. And when questioned after the experiment, participants suggested that their "Aha's" accompanied a click of comprehension-a sudden shift from vague to clear and from hesitancy to certainty about both meanings of the sentence. Some also wondered why the sudden comprehension shift-so obvious in retrospect-took so long to come.
However, Henry didn't catch his breath, uttered no "Aha's" and never expressed certainty about comprehending the second meanings. Indeed, when the experimenter explained second meanings that Henry did not detect, he expressed uncertainty with the phrase "Í wonder," as if he still didn't understand. And he never once said "Yes" (as instructed) to signal when he detected the second meaning for timing purposes.
As a graduate student in 1966, I did not expect these results, but I suspected that something was amiss with Henry's sentence comprehension-including his comprehension of sentences that he himself produced. I just had no idea what that something was, or its relation to creativity and HR damage. What follows is the story of how I later connected the dots. No he couldn't. In [86] , a replication of my 1966 experiment that adopted this procedural change, Henry virtually never discovered the two interpretations of the ambiguous sentences without help from the experimenter. Moreover, he couldn't even repeat sentence interpretations that the experimenter explained to him after he failed to discover them on his own. Perhaps Henry's age, IQ, background or education was the problem? No. In subsequent studies (e.g., [86] Similar timing pauses occur during internal speech, e.g., [20] , and it is noteworthy in [85] that greater fMRI activity for ambiguous than unambiguous sentences occurred not just in the cerebellum, but in areas associated with internal speech-which suggests that the increased cerebellar activity when people comprehend structural ambiguities reflects self-inserted timing pauses in internal speech. Can timing difficulties related to Henry's cerebellar damage explain his comprehension deficits involving our ambiguous sentences? No. Henry also exhibited large deficits in comprehending lexically ambiguous sentences (see [86] ; also [88] ), a type of ambiguity that pauses cannot disambiguate. To illustrate, alter your between-word pauses as you repeatedly produce this lexically ambiguous sentence via internal speech: The soldier put the gasoline into the tank. You will see that the word tank remains ambiguous despite any timing changes that you make. Timing deficits associated with Henry's cerebellar damage cannot therefore explain his deficits in comprehending lexical ambiguities. And reinforcing this conclusion, HR amnesics without cerebellar damage experience the same difficulties as Henry when comprehending lexically ambiguous sentences [89] .
Finally, non-amnesic patients with cerebellar damage exhibit no deficits when reading ambiguous and unambiguous sentences aloud, conclusively ruling out cerebellar damage as the basis for Henry's sentence reading deficits in [30] and [34].
Comprehending isolated ambiguous words
If 
Comprehending metaphoric sentences
Metaphors are not just enjoyable-the stuff of poetry and great art. They are pervasive and fundamental to our everyday thinking, learning and understanding-a way of comprehending one type of concept in terms of another. Without our knowing it, metaphors shape how we perceive, learn and think about the world. For example, war and battle metaphors determine how Americans conceptualize everyday disagreements. We think of arguments as verbal battles that we can win or lose. As in real wars and battles, we can gain or lose ground in arguments, we can take positions and defend them in arguments, and we can abandon indefensible positions and adopt new lines of attack. We can even demolish, wipe out or shoot down an "opponent's" arguments [90] .
So metaphors are important in the real world. Can Henry understand them? A famous anecdote suggests that he can. This is the anecdote. Dr. Suzanne Corkin encountered Henry working on a crossword puzzle and commented, "Henry, you're the puzzle king." To which Henry replied "Yes, I'm puzzling", as if he fully understood Corkin's puzzle king metaphor and wanted to advance the conversation with a double reference to his crossword puzzle habit and his profound amnesia-an existential condition that puzzled him even in old age. But wait. Does Henry's "Yes, I'm puzzling" really indicate that he comprehended Corkin's puzzle king to mean {You are a king among solvers of crossword puzzles}? Dominating at solving puzzles, being puzzling, and working on a puzzle represent distinct concepts. Distracted by his puzzle, Henry perhaps misunderstood Corkin's "puzzle king" to mean "puzzling"-a type of conceptual confusion he frequently exhibited in my sentence comprehension experiments. Or maybe Henry misheard Corkin's "puzzle king" as "puzzling"-in which case, his "Yes, I'm puzzling" is appropriate and makes perfect sense. The hypothesis that Henry can comprehend novel metaphors demands better data.
I therefore gave Henry and memory-normal controls the standardized Test of Language
Competence (TLC; [91] 
Comprehension when reading ambiguous and unambiguous sentences aloud
In [86] , Henry also produced abnormal pauses when reading unpunctuated sentences, but paused normally when commas or periods marked the boundaries between phrases in the text. Why?
Because Henry learned to pause after periods and commas in grade school, but without punctuation to guide him after his lesion, he couldn't create the novel internal representations required to determine the major between-phrase boundaries that required pauses [30] . Now, unusual pauses and general slowness have been linked to cerebellar damage (for a review, see [92] We review H.M.'s prior sentence production experiments by order of publication.
2.1.
MacKay, [77] On trials in the main task in [77] , memory-normal controls carefully matched with H.M. received an ambiguous sentence typed on a card, found its two meanings, and briefly described them.
They had no difficulty with this task, and quickly produced brief, grammatical, comprehensible, and coherent meaning descriptions resembling this typical response to the ambiguous sentence I just don't feel like pleasing salesmen: "I don't want to please salesmen," and "I don't want agreeable salesmen around." However, Henry found this task difficult, as his response to the same sentence illustrates: "The person doesn't like salesmen that are pleasing to him. Uh, and that personally he doesn't like them and and personally he doesn't like them and then I think of a phrase that he would say himself, he doesn't, uh, pleasing, as conglamo, of all of pleasing salesmen."
Ten judges blind to speaker identity rated the grammaticality of each participant's transcribed responses to the 32 ambiguous sentences. The results? Mean grammaticality ratings were significantly lower for Henry than the controls.
Were multi-word ambiguities, e.g., on top of everything in the sentence On top of everything there was a tarpaulin, more difficult for Henry to describe than single-word ambiguities, e.g., tank in The soldier put the gasoline in the tank? No. Grammaticality ratings for Henry's descriptions did not vary with complexity or memory load, defined as the number of ambiguous words that required description.
MacKay and James (2001) [30]
In [30], Henry and memory-normal controls read novel sentences aloud in four experiments.
The results? Henry misread more sentences than the controls, and he almost never corrected his reading mistakes-even when they rendered his sentences ungrammatical. For instance, this was Henry's uncorrected misreading of The boys who were fed hot dogs got stomach aches: "The boys were fed hot dogs got stomach aches."
As in this example, Henry's reading errors usually involved uncorrected omission of short, [83] In [83] , Henry and memory-normal controls described captioned cartoons and explained why they were funny. Again, judges blind to speaker identity rated Henry's descriptions as reliably less grammatical than those of controls. Why? Because Henry's sentences contained large numbers of uncorrected errors such as "it's wrong for her to be"-which rendered his sentences ungrammatical. Subsequent analyses indicated that Henry's errors differed from normal slips of the tongue.
Normal errors, as in "Older men choose to tend, I mean, tend to choose younger wives," don't disrupt ongoing discourse because speakers easily correct them, either on their own or in response to a listener's "What?" However, Henry couldn't even explain his uncorrected, dialog-stopping errors when listeners explicitly asked for clarification. For example, Henry described the protagonist in one cartoon as "making a double correction," and when the experimenter asked what he meant, Henry couldn't say. We called uncorrected, anomalous and conversation-killing errors "major" because they disrupted ongoing communication, and when expressing novel ideas in this and other sentence production experiments, Henry produced reliably more major errors than normal controls [83] .
Henry's major errors took two forms: omissions (his most common error type) and category concatenation errors, where he combined two or more words from inappropriate categories. A single utterance in Henry's transcript illustrates both error types: Henry intended to say something like I would like some of what she had, but instead said "I like some her." The missing would in "I like some her" is an omission error, and the word combination "some her" is a category concatenation error because indefinite determiners such as some cannot combine with pronouns such as her in grammatical English phrases.
Besides being uncorrected and anomalous, Henry's major substitution errors often violated the "syntactic class regularity"-the fact that speakers making normal errors usually substitute words in the same syntactic class, e.g., substituting verbs with other verbs (rather than with adjectives, prepositions, nouns or adverbs), as in our earlier example, where choose substituted for tend and vice versa. Substitution errors in [83] violated the syntactic class regularity reliably more often for Henry than normal controls. The conclusion? Unable to create new internal representations, Henry couldn't combine appropriate words and word categories into novel phrases in coherent sentence-level plans, and lacking a plan against which to compare his erroneous outputs, Henry couldn't correct or repair the incomplete and inappropriate phrases in his erroneous outputs. In contrast, normal slips-of-thetongue reflect activation in error of cortical units represented in a pre-formed sentence-level plan that provides the basis for correcting everyday errors [83] .
MacKay, James and Hadley (2013) [99]
On each trial in [99] , participants tried to create a single grammatical sentence that contained one or two pre-specified target words and accurately described a never previously encountered picture. Normal participants found this task easy, as illustrated by this typical (error-free) description of a clothing store scene with the target words wrong and although: "The woman decided to buy the suit although it looked wrong" (target words appear in italics).
However, Henry found this task difficult, as illustrated by his description of the same clothing store scene and target words: "Because it's wrong for her to be he's dressed just as this that he's dressed and the same way." Here Henry failed to include the target word although, he produced ungrammatical strings such as "he's dressed and the same way," and his paragraph-like description violated the instruction to produce a single grammatical sentence.
Across all 20 word-picture stimuli, Henry produced reliably fewer target words and grammatical sentences than the controls. Why? Because Henry couldn't conjoin the target word meanings into novel internal representations that accurately and grammatically described the pictures. However, as in [83] , Henry produced error-free clichés reliably more often than normal individuals, e.g., the clichés "in a way" and "it's wrong" in his clothing store description.
MacKay and Johnson (2013) [32]
In the experiments in [32], Henry exhibited identical effects of repetition and familiarity in five domains: semantic memory, visual perception, sentence-comprehension, sentence reading and word reading. Likewise in all five domains, Henry adopted deliberate repetition strategies to compensate for his difficulties in forming new internal representations of never previously encountered and completely forgotten information. These findings comport with results in [61] , where Henry had no
